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Introduction
The American health care system is characterized as 
the most expensive health care system in the developed 
world1. According to the most recent health care report 
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the United States spent 16% of its GDP 
on health in 2007 (as compared to the OECD average of 
8.9%). In 2007, the United States spent $7 290 per person 
on health care (compared to $1 035 per person in Po-
land), which is almost two-and-a-half times higher than 
the OECD average ($2 984 per person)2. Yet, despite the 
amount of money Americans spend on health, the health 
care system still suffers from inefficiencies in delivering 
preventive and primary care and palliative and treatment 
services3.
Unlike most developed countries, the United States 
lacks a mandate for universal health coverage. The Unit-
ed States does not have a national health insurance pro-
gram and the health care system is largely based on a fee-
for-service system established in the late 19th Century. 
This has led to a privately run health insurance system, 
based on the free market and a relatively weak regula-
tory framework. Yet, the private market has been unable 
to ensure universal coverage, with 15.4% of the U.S. 
population (46.3 million Americans) without health in-
surance in 20084. Additionally, costs of health insurance 
coverage have continued to rise. Despite efforts by the 
private insurance companies to curtail costs (i.e. move 
to managed-care style insurance), health insurance pre-
miums for families rose 131% between 1999 and 20095.
The election of Barack Obama suggested a shift, even 
if even temporary, in the American political posture. 
The costs of health care and the rising number of unin-
sured Americans without access to proper care was one 
of the key issues of the Obama election campaign. The 
political momentum of President Obama’s victory and 
the fact that both chambers of the Congress are control-
led by the Democrats are crucial driving factors behind 
the reforms. Yet, history has proven that even pragmatic 
change in the American health system is extremely diffi-
cult, and any sort of movement towards a national health 
insurance program is portrayed as a move away from the 
core values of American society, despite the fact that re-
formers have been proposing such a program since the 
early 20th Century.
This article is written primarily for the Polish and the 
European audience. The aim of the article is to provide 
a historical perspective on the American health care sys-
tem and reform, discuss the current state of the system, 
and analyze the potential effects of proposed reforms in 
light of this historical framework. The historical section 
will describe the evolution of the modern American in-
surance system and illustrate how and why the strength 
of the opposition for government health care coverage 
defeated reform efforts in the past. 
1 Igelhart J., The American Health Care System: Expenditures. „The New England Journal of Medicine” 1999; 340(1): 70–6.
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009), Health at a Glance 2009. http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,
en_2649_34631_16502667_1_1_1_1,00.html. pp. 80–89.
3 Parson M., Disparities in health expenditure across OECD countries: Why does the United States spend so much more than other countries? Writ-
ten Statement to Senate Special Committee on Aging – 30th September 2009. http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/Pearson_Testimony_30Sept2009.
pdf.
4 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008.Washington DC 2009. http://www.census.gov/
prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
5 The Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Education Trust. 2009 Annual Survey: Employer Health Benefits. http://ehbs.kff.org/
pdf/2009/7936.pdf.
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At various points in history, the majority of efforts for 
major reform or a national health insurance program in 
the United States met considerable resistance and failure. 
The periods immediately following failed reform efforts 
are characterized with a response from the private sector 
aiming to curtail the rising costs. These responses seem-
ingly moved the American health care system farther into 
the free-market, complicating future efforts for reform. In 
2009, as in years past, the cycle of health care reform has 
repeated: rising health care costs, a public call for reform, 
considerable opposition to reform, and proposals by the 
President and Congress on the table. The question that 
remains for 2010: Will this round of health reform finally 
clear a path to comprehensively alter the complex Ameri-
can health care system or will it once again succumb to 
the opposition, as it had at many times in the past? If the 
former, it may truly be a first step to an ideological shift 
in American political values; if the latter, will the free-
market once again step in to alter its model in an attempt 
to control escalating costs and meet the demand of the 
uninsured? 
History of the American health care system 
and reform
Institutionalization and evolution of a system: voluntary and 
employer-based health insurance 
The private insurance system in the United States 
evolved after a series of failed efforts by Democrats and 
reformists during the 1930s and 1940s to create a govern-
ment sponsored health insurance program. By 1950, about 
54.5 million Americans, roughly one-third of the popula-
tion, had private health insurance6. The decision to exclude 
government regulated universal health coverage by the 
United States government, by default, privatized the ob-
ligation, in effect delegating this obligation to employers, 
individuals and insurance companies and institutionalized 
the employer-based voluntary health insurance system that 
exists today. The private sector emerged as the primary 
source of health insurance coverage for Americans and the 
health care system began shaping itself around it. 
Initially, private health insurance plans emerged as 
a non-for-profit enterprise with prepaid employee plans 
for hospital coverage. This plan became known as “Blue 
Cross.” Soon after, “Blue Shield” plans emerged to cover 
medical costs of physician visits by adopting the Blue 
Cross framework7. When the nonprofit Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield plans came into existence, most coverage 
was based on the individual rather than groups. It wasn’t 
until after World War II, that employers began providing 
benefit packages, including the newly minted Blue Cross/
Blue Shield-style health insurance, to entice workers8. 
At the same time, private insurance companies began to 
recognize the opportunity to make a profit and entered 
the health insurance market as well, in direct competition 
to nonprofit Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans. Employers 
began turning to some of the cheaper alternative plans 
to offer their employees. To accommodate all these 
changes, the government amended the tax code in 1954 
to recognize employer contributions to its employee’s 
health insurance plans as nontaxable. Between 1953 and 
1958, the percentage of Americans covered by private 
health insurance plans increased from 63 percent to 75 
percent, arguably as a result of this tax subsidy9. By the 
mid-1950s, private health insurance, for-profit or not-for-
profit, became a fact of American life. 
During this time, insurance companies also developed 
methods on establishing premiums and assessing risk of 
participants in the plans. The original Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plans used a “community rating” system to assess 
the costs of the plan. The community rating system used 
the locality in which subscribers live as the risk pool to 
base the cost of the insurance. Under a community rating 
system all subscribers in the area pay the same premium 
regardless of their individual health status10. The new pri-
vate insurance plans shifted to a different rating system. 
These plans began using an “experience rating” system 
to assess risk and assign costs of a health insurance pre-
mium. Experience ratings assess risk to the individual 
(or group of individuals) in the plan. For example, if the 
members of group are all young and healthy and rarely 
use health care services, this group’s premiums will be 
less than those of an older group. 
Medicare – a step towards national health insurance? 
One major issue that the private sector could not seem 
to address, however, was the issue of an aging popula-
tion and covering the health care costs of the retired per-
sons. By 1960, it was clear that private health insurance 
was not working for the elderly. As a larger portion of 
the population was beginning to retire and as medical 
technologies and treatment methods improved, costs 
were also rising. Between 1950 and 1960, the cost for 
hospitalization rose about 6.7 percent a year. As a result, 
private health insurance companies raised their rates to 
match the increase in costs, making health insurance for 
the elderly very difficult to attain. By the mid-1960s, only 
about half of the elderly had health insurance, and those 
that did have health insurance had expensive policies 
6 Kresl H., & Malone N., How We Got Here: a history of the American healthcare system with respect to organizational information flows. Uni-
versity of Washington, Information School. March 1st, 2009. 
7 Consumer Union, Blue Cross and Blue Shield A Historical Compilation. http://www.consumersunion.org/conv/conversions_101/legal_context/
doctrines_and_remedies/applying_the_charitable_trust_and_cy_pres_doctrines/Blue%20Cross%20History%20Compilation.pdf.
8 Hermer L., Private Health Insurance in the United States: A proposal for a more functional system. „Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy” 
2005; Vol. 6 (1).
9 Thomasson M., From Sickness to Health: The twentieth-century development of U.S. health insurance. „Explorations in Economic History” 2005; 
39: 233–253.
10 Hermer L., op. cit.
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that did not offer comprehensive coverage11. Moreover, 
from the perspective of the health insurance industry, the 
high costs of covering the elderly was not a profitable 
venture12. 
This situation, and the 1960 election of Senator John 
F. Kennedy to the American presidency, once again 
brought back the movement for a national health insur-
ance program. However, the idea of a comprehensive 
national health insurance program, did not resurface in 
the debate. Rather, the debate focused on covering the 
high-costs of the elderly, most of whom could not afford 
private health insurance. This initiative became known 
as “Medicare”. (It is important to note that many who 
designed the Medicare program of the 1960s expected 
it to be a first step toward universal national health in-
surance13). A few days after his inauguration, President 
Kennedy sent a special message to Congress on health, 
requesting they debate legislation to create a government-
run health insurance system for the elderly. 
The assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 had 
a profound effect on the success of Medicare. In his 1969 
account of the history of the Medicare program, Peter 
Corning noted: “One of the many consequences of that 
tragedy was a surge of public support for the martyred 
President’s legislative program. The new President, Lyn-
don B. Johnson, a renowned legislative leader, moved 
quickly to act upon these sentiments14.” Public support 
for the Medicare program, in particular, was strong dur-
ing this time. Polling from 1964 and 1965 showed broad 
support for the idea of Medicare. According to a January 
1965 Gallup poll, 63% approved of the Medicare initia-
tive and 28% disapproved15.
Despite its popularity, Medicare did face strong oppo-
sition as had similar movements of the 1940s. The fight 
against government intervention in the health care sector 
was led by the American Medical Association. They em-
ployed a similar method of public relations as they did in 
the 1940s by reaching out directly to the public. One fea-
ture of the anti-Medicare campaign was called “Operation 
Coffee Cup”, a recording featuring (then actor) Ronald 
Reagan. On the recording, Reagan, “as a private citizen”, 
described Medicare as the imminent “imposition of statism 
and socialism” by the government on its people and that if 
Medicare passed, Americans “will awake to find we have 
socialism”. The AMA sent the recording to physicians’ 
wives to play for their friends and neighbors and urged 
citizens to write to their Congressmen to stop Medicare16,17.
The opposition’s efforts, however, failed. In 1965, 
Congress passed the Medicare program as well as a gov-
ernment health care program aimed at providing assist-
ance for the poor, labeled “Medicaid”. Unlike Medicare, 
which is a federally-administered program, Medicaid 
provides funding to states (who must match that fund-
ing amount) and requires the states to administer their 
own programs. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid 
in 1965 was a significant victory for reformers and has 
considerably altered the way the American government 
participates in the health care sector. These programs, 
particularly Medicare, remain widely popular today, and 
despite some efforts to reform them, there have been no 
efforts to repeal them. 
HMOs and the rise of managed care
By 1970, about 205 million Americans were covered 
by private health insurance. Still, costs continued to rise. 
Between 1950 and 1970, national health expenditures 
increased 586% (from $12.7 billion to $74.4 billion), 
while the American gross national product (GNP) only 
rose 347% during the same time period18. The traditional 
response to the increase in medical costs was for the in-
surance companies to raise its premiums. However, as 
the system was employer-based, employers experienced 
difficulties in maintaining these costs for their employ-
ees. The costs were becoming too difficult to contain and 
a shift in how the delivery and payment system had to 
somehow accommodate these changes. 
As health care costs continued to increase, those 
reformers who advocated for national health insurance 
coverage continued their fight, building off the success 
of Medicare. The most notable of the reformers was 
a young Senator from the State of Massachusetts, Ed-
ward (Ted) Kennedy – the brother of the late-President 
John Kennedy. In 1971, Senator Kennedy introduced 
legislation, aimed at building the foundation for a uni-
versal, national health insurance system that would 
dramatically change the American health care system. 
Kennedy’s “Health Security Act” was a proposal for 
a universal single-payer plan with a budget for the na-
tional health program to be financed through income 
taxes19. Kennedy’s program, modeled after the Medicare 
program, aimed to create a “single-payer system” where 
the federal government would be the purchaser of all 
health services. 
11 Corning P., The Evolution of Medicare: from idea to law. As republished by the U.S. Social Security Administration. http://www.ssa.gov/history/
corning.html.
12 National Academy of Social Insurance. Medicare and the American Social Contract. Final Report of the Study Panel on Medicare’s Larger Social 
Role 1999.
13 See: R.M. Ball, What Medicare’s Architects had in Mind. „Health Affairs” 1995.
14 Corning P., op. cit.
15 As stated in: Kohut A., Would Americans Welcome Medicare if it Were Being Proposed in 2009? New Research Center, 19 August 2009. http://
pewresearch.org/pubs/1317/would-americans-welcome-medicare-if-proposed-in-2009.
16 Altom L., & Churchill L., Pay, Pride, and Public Purpose: Why America’s Doctors Should Support Universal Healthcare. „MedGenMed” 2007; 
9(1): 40. Published online 2007 February 28. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1925024/ 
17 Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine: Clips can be heard here. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-AAs.
18 Day J.G., Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old Tensions. „Conn. Insurance Law Journal” 1996; Vol. 3 (1).
19 Kaiser Family Foundation, National Health Insurance – A Brief History of Reform Efforts in the U.S., 2009. http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
upload/7871.pdf. March 2009.
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Leading Republicans, who traditionally were against 
national health care legislation, came out in support of 
a form of national health care reform. In 1974, Presi-
dent Richard Nixon addressed Congress to voice his 
support for a national health reform strategy. Some saw 
this as a means to divert attention away from the grow-
ing “Watergate” scandal and a way to diminish support 
for Kennedy’s more liberal reforms20. Nixon’s proposal 
supported the regulation of the existing private insurance 
industry. Nixon articulated his vision for health reform in 
the 1973 National HMO Act, a program which was meant 
to promote competition and give rise to what is known as 
the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Although 
the medical community certainly did not approve of this 
program, it felt that these measures were the “lesser evil” 
compared with the proposals by Senator Kennedy. And, 
as Steinmo and Watts suggest, “congressional conserva-
tives had difficulty arguing against a program whose 
explicit goal was to avoid government intervention by 
encouraging market competition”21.
Signed into law in 1973, the National HMO Act 
provided government subsidies, in the form of grants, 
to private organizations meant to be competition to the 
currently existing health insurance companies. These 
new organizations became known as health maintenance 
organizations, or HMOs. The model of the HMO was 
the first significant emergence of “managed care”. In 
an HMO plan, the subscriber has a primary care physi-
cian who has a contractual relationship with the HMO. 
If the subscriber needs to see a specialist for a specific 
condition, they first must get a referral from their phy-
sician and meet approval by the HMO. The HMOs and 
the medical service providers enter into contractual ar-
rangements and negotiate prices for specific services. All 
medical procedures are subject to review by the HMO in 
an effort to reduce costs.
The National HMO Act of 1973 significantly fostered 
the growth of HMOs by not only offering grants to new 
HMOs, but the law also required employers who cover 
health insurance to offer an HMO plan as a choice of 
benefit. Hence, the number of people covered by this new 
type of entity grew dramatically after its introduction. 
Within a period of ten years, the number of Americans 
covered by an HMO grew from 6 million (1976) to 29.3 
Million in 198722.
Since the introduction of the HMO, the payment sys-
tem for medical practice has changed considerably. Tra-
ditional insurance companies concluded that they could 
no longer contain medical costs and compete with these 
new HMOs at the same time. During the 1980s, insur-
ance companies all but abandoned the practice of indem-
nity. The principle behind indemnity was that physicians, 
acting individually on behalf of their patients, decided 
how most health care dollars were spent. Under the in-
demnity principle, physicians billed for their services, 
and third-party insurers usually reimbursed them without 
asking any questions, because the ultimate payers – em-
ployers – demanded no greater accounting23. However, 
as costs increased, those responsible for ultimately pay-
ing for medical costs of insured individuals (employers) 
and the payers (health insurance companies) set about 
searching for new ways to contain costs, which included 
the abandonment of the indemnity principle. Employers 
and their insurance companies now began taking a more 
active role on the decision of which doctor to go to, how 
much care one receives and the amount charged for each 
service – this has become known as “managed care”.
Managed care in the 1990s and the Clinton health security 
initiative
By the end of the 1980s, the traditional health insur-
ance plans that existed before 1975 were nearly nonexist-
ent. Managed care plans emerged as the model to main-
tain low costs. By the 1990s, employers have changed 
from passive payers to aggressive purchasers and contin-
ued to exert more influence on payment rates, on where 
patients are cared for, and on the content of care24.
These trends led reformers to once again attempt 
systematic reforms and, assert the need for a greater 
role of government in health care. By the early 1990s, 
public opinion expressed support for the reformers. For 
example, the public’s support for universal coverage, in 
which the government guarantees everyone has health 
insurance, reached 82 percent in a 1991 poll. The 1992 
election of President Bill Clinton, who ran with health 
care reform as a key policy issue, also showed renewed 
signs of momentum for health reform, and in September 
1993 President Clinton announced his new health reform 
initiative, “Health Security” referencing the earlier ef-
forts of Senator Ted Kennedy. 
The principles of the Clinton health security care 
initiative echoed those of the past: universality, choice, 
quality, simplicity, and responsibility. The proposal man-
dated employer coverage and focused on the creation of 
regionally-based “Health Alliances” – government regu-
lated purchasing pools of insurance plans that subscribers 
would buy into through their employer and largely based 
on the community-rating system (see above)25. The goal 
of the Clinton proposal was to mandate a change in how 
the insurance market is structured, but included no direct 
publicly sponsored program (with the exception of those 
already existing, such as Medicare and Medicaid). The 
role of government would be to enforce the new man-
20 See: Quandago J., Why the U.S. has no national health insurance: stakeholder mobilization against the welfare state. „Journal of Health and 
Social Behavior” 2004; Vol. 45; Steinmo S., Watts J., It’s the Institutions, Stupid. „Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law” 1995; Vol. 20, No. 2, 
Summer.
21 Steinmo S., Watts J., It’s the Institutions, Stupid. „Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law” 1995; Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer.
22 Gruber L., Shadle M., & Polich C., From Movement to Industry: the Growth of HMOs. „Health Affairs” 1988;Vol. 7(3): 197–208, Summer.
23 Igelhart J., op. cit. 
24 Ibid.
25 Zelman W., The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan. „Health Affairs” 1994; Spring 13(1): 9–29.
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dates, while state governments would regulate the health 
alliances. The rest of the cost control measures and regu-
lation was left to the free market.
Despite initial public support and a clear avoidance 
of overt government intervention (this was the core of 
the strategy), the opposition to the Clinton health care 
reforms was fierce. The public relations effort to oppose 
the Clinton health care plan was unprecedented. One 
study found that an estimated $100 million was spent 
overall in 1993 and 1994 by 650 organizations to influ-
ence the health policy debate26. In advertising, groups 
opposed to the Clinton program outspent supporters by 
a 2-to-1 ratio27. The content of the advertising focused on 
the problems related to government bureaucracy, medical 
costs, and choice of doctors in the Clinton program. 
The opposition’s campaign successfully changed the 
attitudes of the public. By 1994, nearly two-thirds of 
Americans doubted the Clinton reforms. According to 
one poll, 63 percent felt that the Clinton plan had too 
much government involvement. Once again, the politi-
cal barriers to passing health reform emerged. President 
Clinton and the Democrats were unable to achieve a clear 
consensus among the public and policy makers on ma-
jor health care reform. By the end of 1994, the Clinton 
health care reform proposal officially succumbed to the 
political process with the midterm Congressional elec-
tions. Republicans decisively defeated the ruling Demo-
crats and became the majority power in both chambers of 
the legislative branch, the House of Representatives and 
the Senate.
The failure of the Clinton health reforms to material-
ize, once again forced the market to become the default 
modus operandi for reform. As in the past, the changes 
that took place within the health insurance industry in the 
mid-1990s (after the failed reform efforts) saw an even 
greater-shift toward favoring free enterprise. Most nota-
bly in 1994, when the national Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association changed its policies so that its licensees 
(the nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans) could 
convert to “for-profit” status and distribute earnings to 
those who exercise control over the company – the share-
holders. As a result of this decision, the number of inde-
pendent Blue plans fell sharply, from 67 in 1995 to 41 in 
200328. Similarly, HMO plans also shifted from originally 
being organized as nonprofit organizations to publicly-
traded organizations accountable to the investors who 
owned them (the largest investors in managed-care com-
panies became the health care providers themselves: hos-
pitals and physicians)29.
At first, the increased competition in the mid-1990s 
seemed to lower health care premiums and medical costs 
appeared to stabilize. However, by the start of the 21st 
century, trends in health insurance coverage of shifting 
to investor-owned publicly traded managed-care organi-
zations with little government regulation, led to serious 
concerns over the future of the American health care fi-
nancing and delivery system. Most importantly, medical 
costs began to rise again at an even quicker rate than pre-
viously seen and this trend dramatically affected the cost 
of health insurance. Since 2000, the cost of insurance 
premiums increased between 8 and 14 percent per year30. 
Between 1999 and 2009, health insurance premiums for 
families rose 131%, with the average cost of premiums 
for family coverage at $1,115 per month or $13,375 per 
year31.
The mid-2000s witnessed new trends that prompted 
many renewed calls for a national health insurance pro-
gram. These trends included:
• the shifting of Medical decision-making control away 
from the doctors to the insurance companies;
• the shifting of accountability to investors who owned 
shares in the private insurance company;
• the shifting of rising costs to the employers which, in 
turn, hurt the competitiveness of American industry 
as business bore higher costs of health care;
• the transfer of many costs from employers to employ-
ees in an effort to compensate for higher costs;
• an increase in the number of those without any in-
surance coverage to record levels;
• the imposition of restrictions on eligibility of covera-
ge by insurance providers. 
Considering these trends, it is unclear if the financing 
and delivery system can again curtail reform efforts and 
maintain the status quo, or if the concerns and indicators 
noted above will ultimately lead to successful reforms – 
the latter being the hope of Barack Obama and the Demo-
cratic Party in 2009. 
2010: Characterizing the current debate on the U.S. 
health care system
History illustrates that the American health care sys-
tem truly is an example of American “exceptionalism”, 
as ideals of conservatism and the invisible hand of free-
market have prevailed in financing coverage in the health 
care sector. The perspective provided by the historical, 
political, and institutional context forms the basic frame-
work that is necessary to understand the current health 
care debate and reform efforts. As illustrated throughout 
this article, efforts on health care reform in the U.S. are 
characterized through a patchwork of fixes for specific 
problems in the system, while major reform efforts to-
wards a greater governmental role met ultimate failure. 
Since the 1930s, Presidents and the Congress have not 
26 West D., et al., Harry and Louise Go to Washington. „Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law” 1996; Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring.
27 Ibid.
28 Consumer Union, op. cit.
29 Turnock B., Managed Care and Public Health: Strange bedfellows? In: Turnock B., Public Health What it is and How it Works. Jones and 
Bartlett, Sudbury, Massachusetts 2004: 122–128.
30 Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Costs – A Primer, 2007. http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670.pdf.
31 The Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Education Trust, 2009 Annual Survey: Employer Health Benefits, 2009. http://ehbs.kff.
org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf.
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been able to introduce and pass any comprehensive re-
forms toward building a single-payer health insurance 
system. Any reform efforts that did make it into legis-
lation were based on political compromise and heavily 
influenced by special interests and lobbying efforts. 
Many political and health scholars have noted that 
America’s “exceptionalism” hinders reform and favors 
the status quo. For example, David Wilsford noted that 
the “fragmented, diffuse institutions provide structures 
that strongly favor the status quo.”32 Steinmo and Watts 
agreed with Wilsford’s assertion, stating “America did 
not pass comprehensive national health care reform in 
1994 for the same reason it could not pass it in 1948, 
1965, 1974, and 1978... because American political insti-
tutions are structurally biased against this kind of com-
prehensive reform”33. Odin Anderson was much more 
pessimistic in his assessment of the lack of reform. In 
1987 he wrote, “There will never be universal, compul-
sory national health insurance in the United States on the 
pattern of European countries and Canada. [The U.S.] 
appears incapable of supporting one”34.
Many factors can be used to explain health reform 
failure for each specific point in the past. Yet, history 
undoubtedly shows that, time and again, for nearly 100 
years, the private medical interests (insurance and doc-
tors) have managed to stop any development towards 
a compulsory national health insurance system. The sta-
tus quo has predominantly prevailed against any compre-
hensive health reform efforts. By all indication, however, 
2010 will be different. Proposed reforms have already 
passed many key barriers that halted reform in the past, 
and the socio-economic indicators of the American health 
care system point to a greater need for reform than any 
previous point in time. 
Key indicators of the American health care system today 
Internationally, the United States has not fared excep-
tionally well in comparison to other developed nations, as 
Canada, Western European countries, Australia and New 
Zealand. In 2000, the World Health Organization ranked 
the American health system 37th in the world35. The 2009 
OECD report highlights some crucial trends in the Amer-
ican health care sector, most notably that the U.S. spends 
16% of its GDP on health care, higher than any other 
country (average OECD is 8.9%) and 45% of health care 
funding is from the public sector, with the average OECD 
country being 73%36. Public health indicators also point 
to some concerns in the American health care system, for 
example nearly 30% of the adult population in the United 
States is considered obese37. In 2006, the U.S. had 36 dia-
betes-related amputations per 100,000 people (compared 
with an OECD average of 15 per 100,000). Mark Parson 
of the OECD, in a statement to the U.S. Senate wrote, 
that “the United States does not do well in preventing 
costly hospital admissions for chronic conditions, such 
as asthma or complications from diabetes, which should 
normally be managed through proper primary care”38.
Another key indicator of the American health sys-
tem is the imbalance of access to quality of care. Many 
scholars point to the unfair balance of the private health 
insurance system as a driving factor for these poor indi-
cators. It is important to note, that since health insurance 
in the United States is voluntary, and through the employ-
er, a duality in the social-structure has emerged: those 
who have insurance and those who do not. As medical 
costs continue to rise and insurance companies seek to 
maintain a certain level of profit, the number of Ameri-
cans who do not have health insurance has also grown 
considerably since the mid-1990s. In 2008, the number 
of Americans with no health insurance stood at 46.3 mil-
lion, or 15.4% of the population39. Further to this, some 
studies point to the lack of adequate coverage as a key 
indicator of a broken system. One study found that an es-
timated 25 million adults are underinsured in the United 
States, meaning they technically have health insurance 
coverage, but they still have difficulty accessing care and 
specific treatments40.
As I note throughout the article, financing the Ameri-
can health care system has evolved considerably over 
the last 70 years. Today the system is primarily a man-
aged-care system, by which employers who cover their 
employees purchase a plan that manages the care of its 
subscribers. The plans are oftentimes profit-driven and 
take measures to keep costs as low as possible. Employ-
ees, who do have insurance through their employer, usu-
ally share a relatively high portion of the cost. Since the 
1970s, employees with health insurance began sharing 
more and more of the costs of insurance with the employ-
ers. These cost-sharing values are set by the employer 
and the insurance plan to keep subscribers from “over-
using” health care. This takes the form of co-payments 
(a payment that must be made at time of service) and 
deductibles. A deductible is the amount a subscriber 
is responsible per year for his or her own health care 
costs. For example, if an employee has a health insurance 
32 Wilsford D., Path Dependency, or Why History Makes it Difficult but not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a big way. In: Watson J. 
and Ovseiko P. (2005), Health Care Systems: Understanding health care politics. Routlege: New York, USA 2005: 355–383.
33 Steinmo S., Watts J., op. cit.
34 Anderson O., Health Services in the United States: A growth enterprise since 1875. Health Administration Press, Ann Arbor, MI: 280.
35 The World Health Organization, The World Health Report, Health Systems: Improving performance, 2000. http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/.
36 OECD Report, op. cit.
37 See U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html.
38 Parson M., Disparities in health expenditure across OECD countries: Why does the United States spend so much more than other countries? Written 
Statement to Senate Special Committee on Aging – 30th September 2009. http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/Pearson_Testimony_30Sept2009.pdf.
39 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008.Washington, DC 2009. http://www.census.
gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
40 Schoen C., et al., How Many Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults 2003–2007. „Health Affairs. Web Exclusive” 2008; 10 June.
tom VIII, nr 1/2010 117
prywatne ubezpieczenia zdrowotne
plan with a $500 deductible, the employee is responsible 
for the first $500 of medical costs in a defined year, once 
those are paid, the health insurance company will cover 
the remaining costs that year (the higher the deductible, 
the cheaper the plan). As a last resort, employers that can-
not or can not keep up with the rising costs of covering 
their employees have one last option. As Hacker wrote in 
1996, “the simplest solution, of course, [is] to stop offer-
ing insurance altogether, which many new entrants and 
small firms did, especially in the growing service and 
retail sectors of the economy”41.
Not having health insurance, or adequate insurance, 
has a tremendous impact on the overall health of the so-
ciety and some recent studies illustrate dire consequenc-
es. One study found that in 2007, 62.1% of all personal 
bankruptcies in the United States had a medical cause. It 
also noted that, most medical debtors were well educated 
and middle class; three quarters had health insurance and 
the share of bankruptcies attributable to medical prob-
lems rose by 50% between 2001 and 200742. Another 
study found that over 35,000 persons between 18 to 64 
die annually as a result of lack of health insurance43. 
Similarly, a study by the Urban Institute found that 
137,000 people died between 2000 and 2006 because 
they lacked health insurance44. Finally, the Common-
wealth Fund concluded: “Absent significant reforms, 
current projections estimate that national per-person 
spending on health insurance premiums will increase by 
94 percent from 2009 to 2020, increasing an average of 
5.7 percent annually”. 
The Obama health reform plan: parallels and lessons 
from history
Memory in politics is oftentimes quite short-term. In 
the current debate, many politicians now draw the par-
allel between President Obama’s efforts and the failed 
efforts of the Clinton proposals of the 1990s. However, 
one should note that the parallels between earlier Presi-
dents, such as Harry Truman, and President Obama are 
just as striking. During Truman’s national health insur-
ance efforts, the opposition was well funded. In 1948, 
Truman had a Democratic Congress, however many 
southern Democrats (or Dixiecrats as they were known 
then) voted conservatively, often with Republicans on 
social issues. In 2010, President Obama also enjoys 
a Democratically-controlled Congress, however, several 
conservative Democrats (or “blue-dogs” as they are often 
referred to today) have threatened to vote against health 
reform and universal coverage if it is too “liberal”. 
The surface similarities between the Truman and 
Obama situations should not obscure the fundamental 
differences in politics and health care between then and 
now. Despite the parallels, the American health care sys-
tem today is still very different than the relatively new 
system of Truman’s time or even Kennedy’s time. His-
tory shows us that physicians and the medical profession 
in the United States, unlike any other country, wanted 
not only to control the methods of treatment, but also 
the methods and sources of payments, in other words, 
the entire health care delivery system. This was the case, 
until the mid-1990s. The rise of managed care and the 
shift from nonprofit to profit-oriented health insurance 
companies, in effect, took away that control. The physi-
cians now find themselves in the position of supporting 
President Obama’s health care reform principles, as evi-
denced by the AMA’s April 13, 2009 letter of support45.
Opposition, however, still exists and is as strong, if 
not stronger, as it has been in the last 100 years. A fairly 
large, well-organized opposition to President Obama’s 
health care proposal emerged during the summer of 
2009. Most notably has been the conservative activist 
group, the “Tea Party Patriots” who organized anti-health 
reform protests throughout the summer of 2009. Other 
conservative opposition groups include Conservatives for 
Patients’ Rights, Americans for Prosperity, and Freedom-
Works, which distributes a “Health Care Action Kit” 
for protesters. Props include an “ObamaCare Insurance 
Card” with the slogan: “A collective plan administered 
by the politicians and bureaucrats of the U.S. govern-
ment”46. The arguments claimed by the opposition are 
very similar to those made in the past 50 years, including 
fears of: “socialized medicine”, a government take-over 
of health care, rationing of care, and long lines at the clin-
ics to receive treatment. 
Key characteristics of Obama’s health care reforms
Similar to President Clinton, President Obama ad-
dressed the Congress in order to outline his principles for 
health reform. The September 10, 2009 address to Con-
gress promoted his vision of health care reform, empha-
sizing the need to make it illegal for insurers to drop sick 
people or deny them coverage for pre-existing conditions, 
and ensure universal coverage, by mandating that every 
American would be required to carry health coverage.
41 Hacker J., National Health Care Reform: An Idea Whose Time Came and Went. „Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law” 1996; Vol. 21, No. 
4, Winter.
42 Himmelstein D., et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a national study. „The American Journal of Medicine” 2009; 
Vol. 122(8). 
43 Wilper A., et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults. „American Journal of Public Health” 2009; Vol. 29 (12), Dec.
44 Dorn S., Uninsured and Dying Because of It: Updating the Institute of Medicine Analysis on the Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality. Urban 
Institute. January 2008. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411588_uninsured_dying.pdf.
45 See: American Medical Association letter to the President. 13 April 2009. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/hsr-principles-
letter.pdf.
46 Rucker P. and Eggen D., Rowdy Protests at Health Forums. „The Seattle Times” 2009; Aug. 6. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/heal-
th/2009607024_townhall06.html.
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Obama charged the Democratically-controlled Con-
gress to develop legislation on health care reform based 
on his vision and key principles, including47:
•  Reduce long-term growth of health care costs for bu-
sinesses and government.
•  Protect families from bankruptcy or debt because of 
health care costs.
•  Guarantee choice of doctors and health plans.
•  Invest in prevention and wellness.
•  Improve patient safety and quality of care.
•  Assure affordable, quality health coverage for all 
Americans.
•  Maintain coverage when you change or lose your job.
•  End barriers to coverage for people with pre-existing 
medical conditions.
Following President Obama’s call for reform, both 
chambers of the U.S. Congress, the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, developed separate legislative 
proposals based on long negotiations, compromise, and 
a need to respond to public skepticism. The proposals 
primarily focused on cost controls and fostering compe-
tition in the private insurance market (a familiar theme). 
By the end of 2009, both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives passed a bill to reform health care; how-
ever both bills were very different, and in order for them 
to become a law, one bill must be agreed upon between 
both chambers. 
Despite the differences between the two bills, com-
mon reforms do exist and would most likely make it into 
the final law. These include48:
1.  Create Health Insurance Exchanges: the purpose of 
the health insurance exchange is to create a market-
place for health insurance plans (similar to the Clin-
ton health alliance), ensure competition, lower costs 
and provide individuals the freedom to choose the 
right health insurance plan for them. Participation in 
the exchanges will be available to individuals without 
insurance or those who are unhappy with their current 
coverage, as well as small businesses that cannot af-
ford to provide coverage directly for their employees 
through traditional plans.
2.  Prohibit insurance coverage based on health sta-
tus or pre-existing conditions: It will be illegal for 
health insurance companies to deny coverage due to 
an existing condition (a common practice) or drop 
coverage as a result of a major illness.
3.  Mandate compulsory health insurance: Individuals 
will be required to obtain health insurance coverage 
or pay a penalty fee. Individuals may apply for a har-
dship waiver if coverage is unaffordable.
4.  Focus on prevention and wellness: Insurance com-
panies will be required to cover all costs of prevention 
and wellness benefits and exempt these benefits from 
deductibles and other cost-sharing requirements in 
insurance coverage. The law will also create a grant 
program for small and medium size companies to of-
fer wellness programs to their employees. 
5.  Provide funding for the public health infrastruc-
ture: The law will provide new funding for state and 
local public health departments to build their capacity 
to address public health epidemics and to be prepared 
for public health emergencies and pandemics.
6.  No new government-run insurance program: The 
new law would not create any new government-run 
program, despite considerable debate for such a pro-
gram (labeled the “public-option”). Many advocates 
of a single-payer program thought that this time aro-
und would be the time to include elements of a natio-
nal health insurance program in the reforms. Howe-
ver, it is clear from the legislative proposals that no 
such program is likely to be created. 
Pass or fail? The fate of the 2010 health care reform
One political commentator, Jacob Wiesberg, recently 
asserted that these reforms would be more than symbolic. 
He wrote, “For the federal government to take more re-
sponsibility for health coverage will be a transformation 
of the American social contract and the single biggest 
change in government’s role since the New Deal”49. On 
January 9, 2010, when referring to the proposed health 
reforms in Congress, President Obama stated: “All told, 
these changes represent the most sweeping reforms and 
toughest restrictions on insurance companies that this 
country has ever known”50. Historically speaking, if 
these proposals would pass, they indeed would be the 
most substantial changes to the U.S. health care system 
since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the 
1960s. However, the political environment remains to be 
the greatest barrier to reform. For most Americans, the 
focus of health care reform has remained largely on the 
political process, often expressed through demonstrations 
of anger and emotion. During the Congressional recess in 
August of 2009, town-hall meetings held across the coun-
try were filled with angry protesters against the health 
care reforms. These protests significantly eroded public 
support President Obama and his health care reforms. As 
late as January 2010, public support for health care re-
form efforts by President Obama has dropped, with 58 
percent of the public opposing the bills previously passed 
by the House and Senate, and only 38 percent supporting 
that legislation51. With the death of Senator Ted Kennedy 
in August 2009 (a major proponent for health reform) 
and the loss of his seat to a Republican during a special 
47 The White House, Health Care. http://www.whitehouse.gov/Issues/health-Care.
48 For more information see: Senate Democrats Lead Historic Passage Of The Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act. http://democrats.senate.
gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=321145& and H.R. 3962, the “The Affordable Health Care for America Act. http://democrats.energycommerce.house.
gov/index.php?q=bill/hr-3962-the-the-affordable-health-care-for-america-act.
49 Weisberg J., Obama’s Brilliant First Year. Slate.com. Posted Nov. 28, 2009. http://www.slate.com/id/2236708/.
50 Weekly Address: President Obama Outlines Benefits of Health Reform to Take Effect This Year: Remarks of President Barack Obama As Prepared 
for Delivery. 9 January 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-outlines-benefits-health-reform-take-
effect-year.
51 CNN.Com (2010, January 26), Poll: Half say start anew on health care bill. CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/26/poll.health.care/ .
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election in January 2010, prospects for reform are still 
questionable. Many factors will lead to the passage or 
failure of the health care bill, however, one thing is cer-
tain: history has shown that any move towards a stronger 
governmental role in health care is incredibly difficult. 
Hacker and Skacpol rightly note that throughout his-
tory, failure to pass major reform on health care and in the 
aftermath of political defeats, the private market emerged 
to rapidly transform patterns of health care financing and 
delivery52. If the Obama Administration and Democrats 
in Congress fail to pass any sort of health care reform 
legislation how would the private market respond? This 
is a key question to ask, since very few options are viable. 
Would it be possible to see a reemergence of nonprofit 
health care plans that are more affordable? Will more 
states address the issue of universal health insurance 
coverage at the state-level (such as Massachusetts, Ha-
waii and Vermont)? Will private insurance become more 
“value-based” (aimed to reduce patient co-payments for 
services that provide important clinical benefit, relative 
to costs)?53 Could private plans begin to move beyond 
managed-care to direct provision of services, from clini-
cal and hospital care to provision of prescription drugs 
and employment of their own medical workforce? These 
are difficult scenarios to envision, still, absent any sort 
of mandated change, the health services researcher and 
health economist could speculate endlessly. 
Hence, the question that still remains for 2010: Is 
Obama likely to repeat history or will he actually be suc-
cessful in passing reforms aimed at significantly altering 
the health care system? It is most likely that the answer 
to this question is that a good number of these reforms 
will pass, despite the strong opposition. Many of the ma-
jor hurdles have already been overcome in the political 
process. Both chambers have passed bills with similar 
proposals, a certain level of public support remains for 
health care reform, and the President has demonstrated 
a commitment to compromise in order to achieve some 
form of health care reform. 
To illustrate the endurance of the reform efforts, 
on February 22, 2010, President Obama and the White 
House released a new proposal outlining specific reforms 
for health care. This new proposal is largely based on 
the existing Senate bill and contains the same reforms 
outlined above in this article. The goal of the proposal 
was to garner further support for the reform efforts and 
encourage Congress to pass the reforms into law54. Fur-
ther to this, on February 25, 2010, the President hosted 
both Democrats and Republicans for a seven-hour long, 
televised summit on health care reform. The summit was 
meant to allow both parties to discuss their ideas for 
health care reform in the framework of the President’s 
proposal and discuss measures to finally pass health care 
reform in Congress. Following the health care summit, 
President Obama indicated his desire to complete the 
health care reform process when he said, “It is time for us 
to act. So let’s get this done”55.
It is likely that President Obama and the Democrats 
will pass several key reforms. Their effect, however, will 
be visible years down the road as most of the reforms will 
be phased in between now and 2014. If successful, they 
will help secure better access to health care in the United 
States and bring down costs of insurance by introduc-
ing new changes to this very complex health system. The 
political consequences, however, will be visible much 
sooner. This year is an election year for Congress. The 
results will be a strong indicator of whether the American 
people agree with these reforms and how policy makers 
will address future efforts to alter the health care system. 
Abstract:
In 2009, following the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the 
United States, the American public entered into a fierce debate on how to 
reform its health care system. The intense debate on health care reform, 
however, is not a new phenomenon in American political life. Debate over 
health care has cycled its way into the American political discourse eve-
ry twenty-years or so. History suggests that forceful opposition has pre-
vailed against most major efforts to alter the health system in the United 
States. Yet, once again the Democratically-controlled Congress and Presi-
dency in the United States aspire to break this cycle of history. With both 
houses in Congress passing a bill with significant reforms, it seems that 
this time may be different. While it is very likely some reforms will pass in 
2010, no law has been signed yet56. In the end, only time will dictate the 
outcome of this round of health reform debates. 
Through a thorough literature review, this article provides the Polish reader a 
sense of health care reform efforts in the U.S. from the historical perspective 
and discusses the current proposed reforms. Particular attention is paid to 
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Streszczenie:
Reforma zdrowotna w Stanach Zjednoczonych: analiza 
historyczna dyskursu
Słowa kluczowe: reforma zdrowotna, opieka zdrowotna w USA, 
finansowanie ochrony zdrowia
W 2009 r., po wyborze Baracka Obamy na prezydenta Stanów Zjedno-
czonych, społeczeństwo amerykańskie rozpoczęło merytoryczną dysku-
sję nad reformą systemu opieki zdrowotnej. Dyskusja ta, znana również 
– dzięki przekazom medialnym – polskiemu Czytelnikowi, nie jest wy-
darzeniem nowym ani związanym z bieżącą sytuacją. Analiza historyczna 
amerykańskiego dyskursu publicznego w wieku XX wskazuje na pewną 
tendencję: każdorazowe zwycięstwo przeciwników reformy niezależnie od 
merytorycznych przesłanek podejmowanych reform. W tym kontekście 
bezprecedensowa zdaje się aspiracja 111 Kongresu Ameryki, kontrolo-
wanego przez polityków Partii Demokratycznej oraz przy współpracy z po-
chodzącym z tej partii Prezydentem, do przełamania dotychczasowego 
52 Hacker J., Skocpol T., The New Politics of U.S. Health Policy. „Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law” 1997; Vol. 22, No. 2, April.
53 More information can be found here: http://www.sph.umich.edu/vbidcenter/index.htm. 
54 The White House (22 Feb 2010), Putting Americans In Control of Their Health Care. http://www.whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal.
55 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary (Feb 27 2010), Weekly Address: President Obama Says Washington Must Use This Opportunity to 
Enact Health Reform. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-says-washington-must-use-opportunity-enact-
health-re.
56 As of completion of this article in February 2010, no reforms were passed.
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cyklu historii. Zdawać się może, że próba ta powiodła się, czego odzwier-
ciedleniem są inicjatywy ustawodawcze obu Izb Kongresu. Chociaż z du-
żym prawdopodobieństwem można przypuszczać, iż amerykański system 
opieki zdrowotnej zostanie w końcu poddany reformie, to jednak na dzień 
dzisiejszy (luty 2010 – data oddania niniejszego artykułu do druku) bra-
kuje przyjętej przez obie Izby Kongresu oraz podpisanej przez Prezydenta 
ustawy regulującej te kwestie. Oznacza to, ze poznanie prawdziwego wyni-
ku tego etapu dyskusji nad systemem opieki zdrowotnej w USA to jedynie 
kwestia czasu. Poprzez pogłębiony przegląd literatury przedmiotu Autor 
artykułu przedstawia polskiemu Czytelnikowi argumentacje poprzednich 
i współczesnych przeciwników reform. Dokładnej analizie poddana jest 
ewolucja systemu ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych, przeszłych niepowodzeń re-
form oraz ich porównanie z podejmowanymi obecnie działaniami na rzecz 
zmiany systemu. Ponadto Autor analizuje współczesne wskaźniki zdrowot-
ne i makroekonomiczne jako czynniki sprzyjające przełamaniu historycz-
nego oporu wobec reformy.
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